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The primary purpose of this st udy is to inv estigate the association between three ownership 
structure characteristics and voluntary intellectual capital (IC) disclosure practices. Data for this  
study is hand collected from th e 2000 annual r eports of 390 Singapore pub licly traded firms. 
Empirical results indicate Singapore publicly listed firms more closely owned were less likely to 
voluntarily disclose IC related information than counterparts with a more diffused ownership  
base. Also, those firms with a h igh level of executive director ownership were less inclin ed to 
voluntarily disclose IC related information than those wher e executive directors had smaller 
holdings in the entity. Finally, findings indicate govern ment linked corporatio ns (GLCs) will  
likely make more voluntary IC disclosures th an non-GLCs. Overall, this study makes sev eral 
unique contributions to the literature. First, the present study provides the first large-scale analysis 
of evidence of the association between ownership structure and voluntary intellectual capital 
disclosures. The study  also contributes by broadening the ex amination of int ellectual capital 
disclosure practices beyond general descriptive overviews. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of intellectual capital (IC) in creating value has become crucial in achieving a 
competitive advantage in the market place (Usoff, 2002). This  role is highlighted by 
Drucker’s (1993, p.54) statement that “knowledge has become the key economic 
resource and the dominant and perhaps even the only source of competitive advantage”. 
Intellectual capital as a so urce of competitive advantage has attracted much attention 
among academics and managers (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Stewart, 
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1997).  The importance of intellectual capital and its management to the organisation is 
not really a new phenomenon (Smith, 2000). Awareness of i ts value has grown 
substantially in recent years. Over the last decade, there has been growing recognition 
that these types of assets have become the most valuable and fastest growing part of our 
economy (Brinker, 1998). Whereas in 1982, tangible assets represented 62% of a 
company’s market value, by 1992 this figure had dropped to 38% (Dzinkowski, 2000). 
Cahill (2000) stated that between 50% and 90% of the value of a com pany creates 
comes not from management of traditional assets, but from the management of IC 
(Cahill, 2000). Today it is clear that intellectual assets and their effective management, 
in fact, may be the only form of sustai nable competitive advantage (Aniwattananpong, 
2000). As the burgeoning demand for knowledge-based products and services is 
changing the structure of the global economy, the role of in tellectual capital in 
achieving competitive advantage is b ecoming an important management issue in all 
sectors. 
 
While there is little consensus as to what intellectual capital actually is, many do accept 
that (IFAC, 1998): 
 
• Intellectual capital is a primary competitive resource in business today; and 
 
• Intellectual capital is a non-traditional, intangible asset; and its accum ulation, 
transformation, and valuation lie at the heart of knowledge management. 
 
This research examines the proposition that k nowledge management is an important 
strategy to Singaporean companies and that this will be reflected by way of disclosure of 
intellectual capital items in a co mpany’s annual financial statements. Supporting this 
expectation is considerable evidence, in particular from Europe, of the genesis of 
reporting frameworks that demonstrate a previous unseen level of public disclosure with 
respect to intangible assets of companies (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2000). In the light of these changes to disclosure, and the pressure such 
changes have imposed to bring about a review of reporting standards generally, this 
research proposes to determine whether company ownership structures have an effect on 
the quantity and quality of intellectual capital disclosures in companies in Singapore. 
 
At present, the vast bulk of research on intellectual capital can be broadly categorized 
into two major streams: (1) definition and description; and ( 2) management and 
measurement (Guthrie and Petty, 2000). While there are a num ber of unanswered 
empirical questions surrounding the definition and description of the concept of 
intellectual capital, this study focuses on the reporting of intellectual capital. 
 
Several key reasons support the focus on Singapore. First, with  the departure of th e 
British following independence, and its lack  of n atural resources, Singapore was 
expected to struggle in creating a “co hesive and robust sense of nationhood and 
economic growth” (Gopinathan, 1997, p.33). Nonetheless, within less than half a 
century Singapore emerged as one o f strongest of t he Asian ‘tiger’ economies being 
classified by the International Monetary Fund in 1997 as a n advance economy 
(Sanderson, 2002). A pivotal reason underpinning Singapore’s development was t he 
development of its IC b ase (Mitchell Williams, 2004). Consequently, an understanding 
of IC is well estab lished and disclosure of related information should be of interest to 
stakeholders of Singapore firms.  
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Second, the disclosure orientation of firm s in Singapore is lik ely to be severely 
influenced by the ownership structure (Chau and Gray, 2002). In general, listed firms in 
Singapore are family-founded, a significant proportion of the outstanding shares are 
owned by the founding family members, and many senior staff positions continue to be 
occupied by members of the founding family.   
 
Another unique feature of the Singapore business environment is the sizeable 
involvement of the government in ownership of publicly listed firms. At the end of the 
1980s, for example, 69% of total assets and 75% of total profits from all domestically 
controlled firms in Singapore were attributed to government linked corporations 
(GLCs). Despite a prog ram of p rivatization during the 1990s, GLCs continue to 
dominate the Singapore business environment. 
 
As noted earlier, for the Singapore government the need to develop the country’s 
intellectual capital base for economic prosperity has long been an established concern. 
As the Singapore government is a m ajor investor in publicly traded firm s, it m ay 
directly and indirectly influence intellectual capital disclosure practices.  
 
The remainder of t his paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
theory and develops the testable hypotheses. The re search design and sample is then 
described followed by a p resentation of the results. The last section summarizes the 
findings and contribution of the present paper, and discusses ideas for future research. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The issue of conflicts between corporate management and shareholders has been an 
important concern of scholars and policy makers alike since Berle and Means (1932) 
first documented the separation of ownership and control. With the separation of 
ownership and control, agency theorists posit that the delegation of decision-making 
authority enables the agent to potentially engage in self-serving behaviour, thereby, 
resulting in shareholder-corporate management conflicts (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Prior 
research suggests th ere are th ree major reasons for why shareholder-corporate 
management conflicts may arise: (1) corporate management’s greater acceptance of risk 
compared to shareholders; (2) ‘short-termism’ time horizon of corporate management; 
and (3) corporate management’s investment preferences (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). 
 
To reduce the possibility of shareholder-corporate management conflicts, ag ency 
theorists stress the importance of mechanisms designed to monitor the behaviour of 
corporate management (Frankforter, Berman and Jones, 2000). Transparency – of 
which voluntary disclosure is a key  component – is viewed as one major form of 
monitoring (Ho and Wong, 2001). Agency theorists propose that the level of 
information voluntarily disclosed is a function of the relationship between the owners of 
a firm (the principals) and corporate management (the agents). That is, voluntary 
disclosure is a m onitoring mechanism principals use to cost-efficiently scrutinize the 
activities of agents to ensure their residual claims are not diluted (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The present study seeks to examine this issue in the context of IC by empirically 
testing the relationship between the level of voluntary IC disclosure and three features 
of ownership structure: (1) ownership diffusion; (2) level of inside director ownership; 
and (3) level of government ownership. Hypotheses formed to test these associations 
are developed in the following subsections. 
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Ownership concentration 
 
Agency theorists argue that firms with greater ownership concentration disclose more 
information to reduce a gency costs and information asymmetry (Fama and Je nsen, 
1983). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that where the level of share ownership is not as 
widely dispersed the potential for conflicts between principals and agents is reduced. 
 
Consequently, where there is likely to be an environment of greater conflict, principals 
are likely to demand more information so they can more effectively monitor that their 
economic interests are optimized . Also, agents are likely  to voluntary disclose more 
details when ownership is diffused so as to signal the market and shareholders that they 
have acted in the best interests of the owners. Results of prior empirical research of the 
association between voluntary corporate disclosures and ownership diffusion are mixed. 
Craswell and Taylor (1992), find no significant association between ownership 
diffusion and voluntary disclosures. Conversely, McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and 
Hossain, Tan an d Adams (1994) find a sig nificant positive association between 
ownership diffusion and voluntary corporate disclosures. Whilst the evidence is 
informative but mixed, Chau and Gray (2002) report, based on a sample of Singapore 
industrial firms, voluntary corporate disclosures levels increase as ownership 
concentration is diminished. 
 
Given the mixed results, plus the lack of any evidence regarding IC disclosure, the 
present study examines the influence of ownership concentration further, forming the 
following testable hypothesis:  
 
H1: The extent of voluntary IC disclosure is lower for Singapore publicly listed firms 
with a high concentration of share ownership than Singapore publicly listed firms 
with a low concentration of share ownership. 
 
Percentage of inside director ownership 
 
Individuals holding senior executive positions (such as chi ef executive officer, 
managing director) in Singapore publicly listed firms often hold significant shares in the 
entities to which they are employed. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that if 
corporate management were to pursue their own self-interests, they would suffer 
increasing losses as their share holdings increased. Realignment through ownership, 
therefore, provides executive directors with the impetus needed to act in  the best 
interests of all shareholders, including themselves (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998).  
Finkelstein (1992) further argues ownership empowers executive directors, enabling 
them to generate new business incentives and strategies, increase innovation and enable 
the firm to adapt more quickly to a ch anging environment. In addition, Zahra, Ov iatt 
and Minyard (1993) suggest ownership allows executive directors to develop better 
strategies in allocating resources to diverse stakeholders, thereby, enhancing a firm’s 
image and reputation. Finally, ownership provides executive directors with an incentive 
to focus on the long-term viability of the firm, which includes the maintenance of its 
intellectual capital base (Hansen and Hill, 1991). Consequently, decisions of executive 
directors would focus on policies that “maintain or improve product q uality and 
innovation through increased research and development spending” (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999, p. 570).  
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In terms of corporate reporting the rationale of Gray’s (1988) ‘secrecy-hypothesis’ can 
be applied. With increased ownership, executive directors’ preference for sec recy is 
likely to decrease as th is group no longer will act as ag ents but principals. 
Consequently, increased ownership is likely to see ex ecutive directors support the 
disclosure of more information so as to meet the needs of other principals. Combined 
with the greater preferen ce for long -term policies, activities and strategies that 
ownership promotes, it is reasonable to predict greater executive director ownership in a 
firm is likely to provide more disclosure on long-term issues such as those related to IC. 
To test this proposed relationship, the following testable hypothesis is formed: 
 
H2: The extent of voluntary IC disclosure is higher for Singapore publicly listed firms 
with a high percentage of inside director share ownership than Singapore publicly 
listed firms with a low percentage of inside director share ownership. 
 
Government ownership 
 
Government ownership may significantly influence corporate disclosure practices such 
as that relate d to IC. For exam ple, various directors on GLCs are also  senior 
government officials. Consequently, these directors may directly or indirectly influence 
the disclosure policies of GLCs to potentially reflect issu es of co ncern to the 
government. With its interest in IC related issues, GLCs may provide more IC 
disclosure due to the presence of senior government officials on t heir boards of 
directors.  
 
Presence of senior government officials on the board of directors alone may not result in 
greater disclosures. Corporate managers of GLCs – n ot being government officials – 
may also perceive a great er pressure to respond to signals from the government than 
counterparts in other entities. For in stance, corporate managers of GLCs may feel a  
greater need to focus on policies – such human resource development – that are to the 
well-being of Singapore as a w hole rather than the shareholders of the entity 
individually (Vernon and Aharoni, 1981). Voluntary disclosure of information on these 
issues may serve as a signal by corporat e mangers of GLCs to the governm ent and 
society at large that they have sought to follow the government’s essential social well-
being policies.  
 
Finally, unlike other types of block holders, the government is perceived to be a l ong-
term investor that would act to protect the GLC from takeovers. 
 
Also, La Porta et al. (1998) argue the government is perceived by creditors as being 
morally and legally responsible for liabilities with the tacit backing of the state implying 
an entity’s guaranteed solvency. Consequently, the cost of capital to GLCs is lik ely to 
be lower.  
 
With the rem oval of takeover threats an d greater ease  with which t o raise funds , 
corporate managers of GLCs may have less fear of disclosing information that could be 
of use to a com petitor. With the interest of th e Singapore government in IC related 
issues and its direct investment in publicly listed firms, it is important to determine the 
possible impact of government ownership on voluntary IC disclosures. The following 
testable hypothesis is thus formed: 
 
 
6 SA Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 19 : No. 1 : 2005 
H3: The extent of voluntary IC disclosure is higher for Singapore publicly listed firms 
classified as GLCs tha n Singapore publicly listed firms with significant 
government ownership. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The first part of t his section describes the proxies used to measure the dependent 
variable, independent variables and control factors. The sample and descriptive data is 
outlined in the last part of this section. 
 
The intellectual capital disclosure index – dependent variable 
 
In recent years, com panies have become aware of the im portance of managing their 
external communication systematically with respect to intellectual capital (Bukh, 2003). 
Various studies of investors and analysts requests for information indicate a substantial 
difference between type of information found in company’s annual reports and the type 
of information demanded by the market (Eccles & M avrinac, 1995). In general 
companies, investors and analysts request more reliable and relevant information on for 
example managerial qualities, expertise, experience, integrity, customer relations and 
personnel competencies – all factors related to intellectual capital (Bukh, 2003).  
 
The dependent variable in this study - level of intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) - was 
measured using a disclosure index: a technique used in prior accounting disclosure 
studies. From a review of th e intellectual capital literature (Guthrie & Petty, 2 000; 
FASB 2001, and Bozzolan et al., 2003) a disclosure index comprising 53 items was 
formed. A zero to four rating criterion is employed to score each disclosure item after 
each annual report had been entirely read at least once. 
 
The intellectual capital reporting frameworks as employed by Guthrie & Petty (2 000), 
FASB (2001) and Bozzolan et al. (2003) were used as a basis for the compilation of the 
disclosure index that was u sed in this study. The intellectual framework consisted of 
five categories (Guthrie & Petty, 2000; FASB, 2001; Bozzolan et al., 2003): 
 
Table 1: Intellectual capital disclosure index 
 
Section one: Intellectual Capital in Human Resources 
1. Employee seniority; 
2. Employee education investment; 
3. Employee education costs; 
4. Gender distribution of employees; 
5. Racial distribution of employees; 
6. Age distribution of employees; 
7. Share of employees participating in development plans; 
8. Number of development days per employee; 
9. Education costs per employee; 
10. Development costs per gender of employees; 
11. Development costs per racial group of employees; 
12. Employee satisfaction; 
13. Employee turnover; 
14. Increase in value per employee; and 
15. Growth (decline)/recruitment of employees 
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Section Two: Intellectual Capital in Customers 
16. Distribution of revenue by markets/products; 
17. Marketing expenditure; 
18. Number of customers per employee; 
19. Marketing expense per customer; 
20. Administrative cost per unit of marketing expenditure; 
21. Customer satisfaction; 
22. Repeat purchase/contracts; 
23. Customer with long term relations; 
24. Customer orientation strategy; and 
25. Customer loyalty. 
Section Three: Intellectual Capital in Information Technology (IT) 
26. Total IT investments; 
27. Number of internal IT customers; 
28.  Number of external IT customers; 
29. Investment in IT and research and development; 
30. PCs per employee; 
31. Portable PCs per employee; 
32. IT expenditure per employee; 
33. IT expenditure to turnover; and 
34. Extent of IT literacy in the company. 
Section Four: Intellectual Capital in Processes 
35. Cost per process; 
36. Human resource distribution by process; 
37. Lead time; 
38. Product development time; 
39. Running in expenses for new organizational units; 
40. Error rate in processing; 
41. Waiting time for processes; 
42. Quality of processing activities; and 
43. Reputation of the company. 
Section Five: Intellectual Capital in Property (IP) 
44. IP investments/purchased during year; 
45. Distribution of IP held; 
46. Cost of IP developed during the year; 
47. Number of IP items held/developed; 
48. Number of development days on IP; 
49. Number of employees involved in development of IP; 
50. Administration costs per unit of IP development expenditure; 
51. Increase in value per IP item; 
52. Reputation of IP developed; and 
53. IP renewed. 
 
Section one, human capital: this refers to human resources and includes general features 
such as em ployee characteristics (for e xample seniority, age, race, and ge nder), 
education (for example costs and i nvestment). Section two, ex ternal structure: this 
relates to the relationship of the company with different external stakeholders, and 
includes elements such as customers, marketing, business collaborations, and strategies. 
Section three, information technology: the disclosure of intellectual capital investments 
relating to the use by the organisation of information technology, and includes elements 
such as value of investment, number of users, and number of employees who possess 
computers. Section four, processes: intellectual capital elements that are created within 
the company or acquired from outside (management and production processes). Section 
five, items that are related to the intellectual capital elements that are protected by law 
(patents, copyrights, and trademarks). 
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The rating criterion is fully defined as follows: 
 
• Quantitative/Monetary – If the disclosure item was cl early defined in monetary 
terms or actual physical quantities then a score of four (4) was assigned. 
 
• Descriptive – If the disclosure item was discussed showing clearly its impact on the 
firm or its policies then a score of three (3) was assigned. 
 
• Obscure – If the disclosure item is discussed in limited references or vague 
comments whilst discussing other topics and themes then a score of two (2) was 
assigned. 
 
• Immaterial – If the firm states that the disclosure item is immaterial to the financial 
well-being and results of the firm then a score of one (1) was assigned. 
 
• Non-disclosure – If t he disclosure item does not appear in the annual report then a 
score of zero (0) was assigned. 
 
Proxy measures of independent variables  
 
The proxy measures for the three independent variables are defined as: 
 
1. Ownership Concentration (OwnCon) : ratio of nu mber of outstanding common 
shares held by individuals or organizations classified as substantial shareholders 
(those holding more than 5% of outstanding shares) to the total number of 
outstanding common shares of the firm at the end of the 2000 financial year; 
 
2. Percentage of outstanding shares owned by executive directors (PerExeOwn): ratio 
of number of outstanding common shares held by executive directors to the total 
number of outstanding common shares of the firm at the end of 2000 financial year; 
and 
 
3. Government Ownership (GLCOwn): dummy variable where a firm  classified as a 
GLC (firm where government holds 10% or more or the outstanding common 
shares) was coded one (1); otherwise the firm was coded zero (0) 
 
Control factor proxy measures 
 
Six control factors (auditor; level of internationalization; leverage; firm size; 
profitability and industry influence), drawn from a rev iew of related corporate 
disclosure research were included in th e linear multiple regression analysis. Proxy 
measures are briefly described as follows: 
 
1. Auditor (Auditor): dummy variable where firm was co ded one (1) if independent 
auditor is a Big-5 firm; otherwise the firm was coded zero (0) 
 
2. Level of Internationalization (Internationalization): composite score of three 
significant and theoretically distinct dimensions – amount of foreign sales (average 
ratio of foreign  sales to  total sales fo r 2000 financial year), foreign p roduction 
(average ratio of non-domestic assets to total assets at the end 2000), and geographic 
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dispersion (number of countries in wh ich a firm had subsidiaries, expressed as a  
percentage of the highest number of c ountries in which a firm included in the 
sample has subsi diaries) – t he composite score has a theoretical range  of zero to 
three;1 
 
3. Leverage (Lev): - total debt divided by average total shareholders’ equity as reported 
in each firm’s 2000 annual report. 
 
4. Firm Size (Size): - natural log2 of annual sales as reported in each firm’s 2000 annual 
report; 
 
5. Return on Total Equity (ROE): ratio of a firm ’s operating net income to total 
shareholders’ equity as reported in each firm’s 2000 annual report; and 
 
6. Knowledge Industry (KnowInd): dummy variable with firms determined to be R&D 
intensive3 coded a one (1), otherwise coded a zero ( 0) (Wruck, 1993; Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998). 
 
Sample data and descriptive statistics 
 
Data from 390 domestically listed Singapore firms4  was hand collected from their 2000 
annual reports and SGX Handbook (1998, 1999, 2000). Table 2 presents the mean, 
median and standard deviation for the untransformed dependent and independent 
variables, and control factors. The mean (median) voluntary IC disclosure score for the  
390 sample Singapore publicly listed firms is 36.702 (40.400). 
 
Consistent with expectations based on previous surveys, the mean for OwnDif 
suggested the level of o wnership across Singapore publicly listed firms (62.543%) is 
highly concentrated. Also, executive directors generally have sizeable ownership stakes 
in Singapore publicly listed firms that is higher than in Western developed economies 
such as the Canada, United Kingdom and United States (see, for exam ple, Beasley and 
Salterio, 2001; Klein, 2002).  
 
Finally, descriptive statistics for the independent variables indicate that the government 
is a significant block holder in more than 14 percent of Singapore publicly listed firms.  
 
 
                                                
1This proxy measure is based on the approach used by Sanders and Carpenter (1998). 
 
2Transformation results in the re-expression of data on a new sca le using a single mathematica l 
function for each data input. Transforming the data using natural logarithmic transformation, improves 
interpretation and compatibility of the data, enhances the symmetry, stabilises the spread and improves 
the linear relationships between and among vari ables. This transformation makes  it possible fo r 
correlation and regression analysis to be used. 
 
3A firm was defined as being R&D sensitive if it se parately disclosed the amount of R&D expense in 
their annual report. 
 
4The final sample used in the ana lysis reported in  the present study represents 95 .35 percent of 
Singapore publicly traded firms listed with the  SGX for the entire twelve months of th e 2000 calendar 
year. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for dependent variable, independent variables and 
control factors 
 
Description of Variable Variable Name Mean Median 
Std 
Deviation 
IC disclosure index scor e in the 
2000 annual report ICD 36.702 40.400 13.145 
Ratio # outstanding common shares 
held by individuals or 
organizations classified as 
substantial shareholders to the total  
# outstanding common shares 2000 
financial year end OwnCon 62.543% 57.594% 16.83% 
Ratio # outstanding common shares 
held by executive  directors to the  
total # outstanding common shares 
at 2000 financial year end PerExeOwn 24.778% 15.156% 26.688% 
Dummy variable with GLC (firm 
where government holds 1 0% or 
more or the outst anding common 
shares) coded on e (1); otherwise 
coded zero (0) GLCOwn 14.103% N/A N/A 
Dummy variable coded one ( 1) if 
independent auditor is Big- 5 firm; 
otherwise coded zero (0) Auditor 92.821% N/A N/A 
Composite score of ratios for the 
dimensions of foreign sales, foreign 
production and geographic 
dispersion as r eported in 2000  
annual report Internationalization 0.830 0.797 0.616 
Total debt divided by  total 
shareholders’ equity as repor ted in 
2000 annual report Lev 31.262% 11.550% 22.49% 
Annual sales as reported in each 
firm’s 2000 annual report Size (S$mill.) 301.253 86.527 796.381 
Ratio operating net inco me to total  
shareholders’ equity as repor ted in 
2000 annual report ROE 8.95 7.54 15.42 
Dummy variable where R&D  
intensive firm5 coded a one (1), 
otherwise zero (0 KnowInd 40.641% N/A N/A 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 3 presents bivariate analysis (using Pearson correlations) results of correlation s 
between the dependent variable, independent variables and control factors. Spearman 
correlations yield similar findings. The correlations show a si gnificantly negative 
correlation between ICD and OwnDis, and a significantly positive correlation between 
ICD and GLCOwn. These results support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 respectively. 
 
There is also a significantly negative correl ation between the dependent variable and 
PerExeOwn. The negative sign is co ntrary to the predicted positive association. This 
result, however, may imply corporate management entrenchment.  
 
                                                
5A firm was defined as being R&D sensitive if it se parately disclosed the amount of R&D expense in 
their annual report. 
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Table 3 results also indicate significant correlations between the independent variables 
and control fa ctors respectively. The highest value is between Size and PerExeOwn 
(Pearson correlation = 0.245). Farrar and Glauber (1967) and Hair, Anderson, Tatham 
and Black (1995) state m ulticollinearity is on ly a con cern when correlation values 
exceed 0.80. As a further check for pos sible multicollinearity concerns, variance 
inflation factor (VIF) values are computed. VIF values are reported in the last co lumn 
of Table 4. 
 
The VIFs values for all independent variables and control factors were below 2.0 
considerably below the critical value of 10.00 (Netter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1989). 
Overall, bivariate analysis and VIF results indicate multicollinearity is n ot a seriou s 
concern. 
 
Table 4 contains the results from the linear multiple regression model used to test the 
respective hypotheses. Overall, the linear multiple regression is highly significant 
(p<0.001). The adjusted coe fficient of determin ation indicates that 51.7% of the  
variation in ICD is explained by variations in the independent variables and c ontrol 
factors. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the coe fficient for OwnDis is negative and 
statistically significant (p<0.001). This finding suggests that Singapore publicly listed 
companies with a hi gher concentration of ownership were less likely to voluntary 
disclose IC related information than counterparts with a more diffused ownership 
structure. Hypothesis 3 is also supported by the empirical findings reported in Table 4. 
That is, Sing apore publicly listed firms having the government as a sign ificant block 
holder were more likely to voluntarily disclose more IC d etails than those Singapore 
publicly listed firms not classified as a GLC. The coefficient for PerExeOwn is 
statistically significant. Contrary to expectations, however, the directional sign on the 
coefficient is negative rather than positive. 
 
This finding implies ownership amongst executive directors of Singapore publicly listed 
firms is lik ely to lead to a decrease in v oluntary IC disclosures rather than the 
promotion of increased disclosure. This finding further supports correlation findings 
suggesting management entrenchment amongst executive directors.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH IDEAS 
 
The purpose of the present study is tw ofold: (1) analyze the voluntary IC disclosure 
practices of Singapore publicly listed firms; and (2) empirically test the ass ociation 
between three characteristics of o wnership structure and the amount of voluntary IC 
disclosure. 
 
The three characteristics  of owners hip structure in question are ownership 
concentration, level of exe cutive directors’ ownership and ext ent of g overnment 
ownership. In respect to the first purpose of the present paper, results indicate that 
Singapore publicly listed firms do vol untary disclose IC related information. This 
finding is of interest due to the reliance of Singapore publicly listed firms on IC related 
assets (such as human resources) and the long-term focus of the government in 
developing this asset base. The reluctance of Singapore publicly listed firms to 
voluntarily disclose IC related information may be d ue to various factors including 
ownership structural characteristics. The results of lin ear multiple regression tests 
provide strong support for this proposition. Specifically, results indicate that Singapore 
publicly listed firms which are more closely owned were less lik ely to voluntarily 
disclose IC related information than counterparts with a more diffused ownership base. 
Also, those firms with a high level of executive director ownership were less inclined to 
voluntarily disclose IC related  information than those where ex ecutive directors had 
smaller holdings in the entity. Finally, findings indicate GLCs will lik ely make more 
voluntary IC disclosures than non-GLCs.  
 
Findings of the present study are subject to some limitations that provide initiatives for 
future research. The present study, for example, focuses on publicly listed firms from 
one single domestic setting. 
 
Prior research indicates voluntary disclosure practices are potentially subject to societal 
level factors such as c ulture and the legal system. Consequently, findings may be 
subject to generalizability concerns. Further research of the association between the 
ownership structure and voluntary IC disclosure practices could be extended to 
alternative domestic set tings. Also, own ership characteristics included in the present 
paper are not exhaustive. Future research should fully explore the impact of ot her 
ownership features and their association with IC disclosures to gather a c omplete 
picture of the impact of this dimension. Also, this study is essentially cross-sectional in 
nature. Future research may wish to focus on examining the association of independent 
variables covered in this study and IC disclosure practices across time. Finally, findings 
are constrained by the validity and reliability of the disclosure index and scoring system 
applied. Future studies should seek t o re-test the instrument acr oss alternative socio-
political and economic settings both to test its validity and/or make refinements.  
 
Despite its limitations, the present study makes several unique contributions. First, the 
present study provides evidence of voluntary IC disclosure practices amongst publicly 
listed firms from a newl y emerged economy in the Asi a-Pacific region. Given the 
significance of emerging and newly emerged economies to the overall well-being and 
balance of the global economy, i t is important to establish an understanding of the 
development of in tellectual capital reporting practices in  different socio-political and 
economic settings Second, the empirical analysis provides a  f ramework for analyzing 
factors that may influence IC disclosure practices, which would ena ble companies to 
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report on their intellectual capital assets to shareholders, stakeholders, resulting in better 
investment and strategic decisions. 
 
This disclosure index is an improvement on prior IC disclosure research, that comprised 
primarily of l imited general surveys that did not investigate factors that may have 
explained variations in in tellectual capital disclosure practices. Overall, find ings from 
the present study have implications for numerous parties such as institutional investors, 
regulators, shareholders and corporate management in general.  Singapore companies 
are family-founded, and a significant proportion of the outstanding shares are owned by 
the founding family members, which means that the shares are closely owned and less 
likely to voluntarily disclose IC related  information, which is contrary to the growing 
global demand for the management, measurement and reporting of intellectual capital.  
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